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T his essay argues that while the complete lack of l iquidity 
characterizing the most severe phase of the financial crisis unleashed 
in September 2008 is now a thing of the past, lending and production 
activity in the industrialized countries are both contracting rapidly and 
the financial system is still undercapitalized. Of all the external channels 
through which the crisis has been transmitted to Latin America, the drop 
in remittances is the least important. The most widespread negative effects 
will come from the decline in the volume of international trade and the 
sharp deterioration in the terms of trade for commodities. In addition, a 
period of very restricted external private-sector financing lies ahead. The 
region’s economies have entered this crisis in a stronger position than in 
the past, mainly because public debt is lower and international reserves 
are large, but this will only partially mitigate the repercussions of the worst 
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The global economy is widely acknowledged to be 
going through the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. Although the industrialized 
world may be spared a contraction in production activity 
as sharp as the one experienced then, it is clear that it 
is also passing through the deepest recession since the 
Second World War (the point at which a “recession” 
becomes a “depression” has never yet been completely 
clarified). The crisis is reaching every corner of the 
planet. Given the role of China as a mainstay of global 
economic dynamism in recent decades, the contraction 
of its exports in November and December 2008 and 
the virtual stagnation of its economy during the fourth 
quarter of that year are the clearest evidence for the 
depth of the global crisis.
In the case of  Latin America, the markedly 
favourable conditions of the 2003-2007 period, resulting 
from an unusual combination of a financial boom, 
exceptionally high commodity prices and strong 
remittances from migrant workers, have also come 
to an end. A number of the region’s economies were 
already experiencing a substantial slowdown over 
the course of 2008, among them Colombia, Mexico, 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and almost all 
the smaller economies of Central America and the 
Caribbean. As will be seen, financing became scarcer 
from the third quarter of 2007, coinciding with the first 
phase of the financial crisis in the United States. Then 
in mid-2008, the fall in commodity prices began. But 
it was the global financial collapse of mid-September 
2008 that unleashed the most profound changes by 
causing credit to dry up, substantially raising risk 
spreads, turning the fall in commodity prices into a rout 
and triggering a deep recession in the industrialized 
world. Even those Latin American economies that 
were still highly —not to say increasingly— dynamic 
up to the third quarter of 2008, such as Brazil and 
Peru, ran into a wall.
With hindsight, the peculiarity of the developing 
world was its ability to insulate itself  to some extent 
from the first phase of the crisis thanks to the renewed 
commodity price boom, the relative security its very 
high levels of international reserves represented for 
external capital and the continuing dynamism of the 
major Asian economies. This gave rise to a theory, 
propounded by the International Monetary Fund 
(imf) among others, that the developing world would 
“decouple” from adverse trends in the industrialized 
countries. To use the terminology employed by Calvo 
(2008), however, that “Indian summer” was followed 
by a “storm” triggered by the global financial crisis of 
September 2008, whereupon it became obvious that 
the decoupling theory was sheer fantasy.
This essay will analyse the effects of  the 
international crisis on Latin America. Following 
this introduction, the second section considers the 
financial crisis in the United States. The third section 
looks at the three external channels through which 
the crisis has been transmitted as the mechanisms 
that produced the earlier boom have been inverted. 
The fourth contains some considerations on the 
vulnerability of the region’s countries and is followed 
by a short section of conclusions.
As will become clear in the second section, the 
international situation was still very fluid at the time 
this essay was being completed (January 2009). Having 
become so severely undercapitalized, the global 
financial sector had not found its poise and lending 
was continuing to contract, while economic activity 
and international trade were declining rapidly. What 
this indicates is that the intensity and duration of 
the crisis were still unknown. At the same time, new 
macroeconomic packages were being implemented, 
among them the second phase of the United States 
financial rescue plan, the fiscal programme announced 
by the Obama administration and the new financial 
rescue package announced by the British Government. 
Consequently, many of the observations made in this 
essay are subject to future contingencies.
I
introduction
  The author is grateful for the assistance provided by María Paula 
Carvajal in preparing this document. This essay was written for the 
United Nations Development Programme (undp) project “Estado, 
democracia y mercado: informe regional sobre la democracia en 
América Latina”.
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By January 2009, a year and a half  had elapsed since 
the subprime mortgage securitization crisis erupted in 
the United States, and four months since the fateful 
week that began on Sunday 14 September 2008 with 
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, one of the big five 
investment banks in the United States, and the rescue 
of another, Merrill Lynch, which became a subsidiary 
of Bank of America; Bear Stearns, having been bailed 
out in March, began the process of merging with J.P. 
Morgan Chase. The week continued with the rescue 
of the country’s leading insurance firm, American 
Insurance Group (aig), and the compulsory sale of the 
leading savings and loan bank (Washington Mutual) 
and one of the largest commercial banks, Wachovia. 
Many smaller institutions had already gone under 
and more have done so since. Furthermore, some 
investment banks that were still independent, such 
as Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley (in October 
the Japanese financial group Mitsubishi ufj would 
acquire a 20% stake in the latter), became bank holding 
companies, thereby coming under the supervision of 
the Federal Reserve. On Wednesday 17 and Thursday 
18 September, the United States financial system was 
on the verge of total breakdown and the period that 
came to be known as the “credit crunch” began; at 
its most critical stage, interbank lending and issues 
of  commercial paper were paralysed. A series of 
bankruptcies also began among European banks that 
week, and still continues. Some British banks were 
already in difficulties beforehand.
As the great economic historian Charles 
Kindleberger has pointed out (Kindleberger and Aliber, 
2005), frequent financial crises are an embedded feature 
of capitalism’s history. Since the 1960s, furthermore, 
there has been a greater tendency towards financial 
crises of various kinds, coinciding with different global 
economic liberalization processes (Bordo and others, 
2001). In the case of  the United States, this is the 
third banking crisis of recent decades. The first was 
the Latin American debt crisis, which was skilfully 
managed so that its cost would be paid for by Latin 
America and it would not be seen for what it also was, 
the bankruptcy of the leading United States financial 
institutions. The second was the crisis in the United 
States savings and loan system in the late 1980s, and 
the third is the one being experienced now. To these 
might be added the major stock market collapses, 
including “Black Monday” in October 1987 and the 
bursting of the bubble in technology stocks at the 
beginning of the present decade, plus three episodes of 
acute dollar weakness, the latest of which was already 
in evidence before the September crisis temporarily 
reversed the phenomenon.
The frequency of crises is essentially due to the 
incapacity of financial systems to self-regulate, one 
corollary of  which is that financial liberalization 
measures sow the seeds for them. The fundamental 
problem, as Minsky (1982) pointed out a quarter of a 
century ago, is that confidence tends to rise as financial 
booms proceed, leading financial agents to take 
positions that become riskier and riskier as financial 
liabilities outstrip current revenues or, viewed from a 
balance sheet perspective, as borrowing rises relative 
to capital (greater leverage). The logic of this mode 
of operating in booms is clear, as asset-price inflation 
allows returns to be obtained with limited capital. 
Booms thus end with overborrowing by all agents and 
undercapitalization of financial institutions, sowing 
the seeds of bankruptcies among both borrowers and 
financial intermediaries. Although this logic is recurrent, 
the current crisis must be the “acid test” showing that 
financial markets, even the most sophisticated ones, 
are incapable of self-regulation.
Faced with the collapse experienced by many 
developing countries as a result of the successive Asian, 
Russian and Latin American crises at the end of the last 
century, economic orthodoxy ended up by accepting 
that financial liberalization had to be accompanied 
by better prudential regulation and supervision 
(something that had already happened in a number of 
Latin American countries after the 1980s debt crisis). 
But this recommendation was not applied in the heart 
of  global financial capitalism, where deregulation 
continued. Among other consequences, this led to 
the final removal, in 1999, of the boundaries between 
investment banking and commercial banking that had 
been established in the 1930s and, in 2004, of capital 
requirements for investment banks, allowing these to 
double their leverage levels over the following years. 
Furthermore, there was no regulation whatsoever of 
“financial innovations” such as subprime mortgages, the 
securitization of these or the proliferation of financial 
II
The global financial crisis
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derivatives, particularly the new type of credit insurance 
that became known as credit default swaps. Nor was 
there any attempt at controlling the ever-greater array 
of off-balance sheet financial assets in the hands of 
even the most heavily regulated institutions (banks), 
while new intermediaries such as hedge funds were 
completely unregulated.
On top of all this, many non-bank agents began to 
specialize in maturity transformation, i.e., issuing bonds 
to raise short-term funds and then using these to make 
long-term loans or investments, thus creating a kind 
of “shadow banking system”. This is a function that 
has traditionally been assigned to commercial banks 
and that becomes very problematic during crises. Bank 
runs are one of its most disastrous manifestations, but 
while this problem has not been wholly absent during 
the recent crisis, it has tended to disappear as deposit 
insurance has become widespread. However, since 
non-bank agents do not have access to this insurance, 
which in any case is limited in its coverage, the problem 
has now been manifested in massive withdrawals from 
mutual funds, hedge funds and the like.
The initial responses of the economic authorities 
centred on improving liquidity provision facilities 
and lowering central bank intervention rates, i.e., 
on effectively discharging their function as lenders 
of last resort. Measures to provide access to Federal 
Reserve discount window loans were first announced in
mid-August 2007, shortly after the market in mortgage-
backed financial securities began to collapse (figure 1 
shows one aspect of this collapse, in the market for 
securitized commercial paper). In September 2007, 
the Federal Reserve cut interest rates for the first 
time. Of the world’s major central banks, the Federal 
Reserve has been aggressive on both fronts, as has the 
Bank of England, while the European Central Bank 
has taken a much more conservative line. Over time, 
credit facilities proliferated and could be used by a 
range of intermediaries who had never had access 
to them before. The first step in this direction was 
taken in the United States in March 2008 as a result 
of the bankruptcy of Bear Stearns, when investment 
banks were allowed to access specific Federal Reserve 
lending facilities.
FIGURE 1
United States: commercial paper in circulation
(Billions of dollars)
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In the first phase of the crisis, which lasted from 
mid-August 2007 until the Bear Stearns bankruptcy in 
March 2008, the mortgage-backed securities market 
deteriorated sharply. The fact that many of  these 
securities were held by financial intermediaries, and 
did not necessarily appear on their balance sheets, 
contributed to an atmosphere of  mutual distrust 
regarding the quality of their portfolios which in time 
was to become the most troublesome factor in the 
crisis. The use of credit lines created by the Federal 
Reserve was moderate to begin with but began to pick 
up in March 2008, a month that may thus be seen as 
marking the start of a second phase in the crisis. At 
the same time, the amount of government securities 
held by the Federal Reserve and not lent out to private 
agents declined, allowing it to maintain the total size 
of its portfolio (see table 1). Interest rates were cut 
very sharply up to March 2008 (by between three and 
four percentage points), and these cuts fed through to 
short-term Treasury securities, the interbank market 
and deposit and lending rates in the banking system, 
but rates in the capital markets (corporate bonds 
and those of state and local governments) and those 
for mortgages remained practically unchanged (see 
table 2).
The scale of  the collapse in mid-September 
2008, when the third phase of the crisis began, took 
the authorities and the market itself  by surprise. 
As lending seized up, the central bank took some 
completely unexpected measures, including the decision 
to purchase commercial paper through a limited 
liability company (actually a fund administered by 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) whose assets 
are backed by the Federal Government. This was the 
mechanism that had been designed since March to 
manage the Bear Stearns portfolio and that was to 
be used to manage that of aig. With these measures, 
the policy focus switched from shoring up liquidity in 
the system to reactivating lending. This goal gradually 
came to include lower interest rates on commercial 
credits (for vehicle purchases, education and credit 
cards) and mortgages.
One consequence of  this was the large-scale 
creation of new credit facilities increasingly oriented 
TABLE 1
Portfolio of the Federal reserve
(Billions of dollars)
Week ending 8 Aug. 2 Jan. 12 March 10 Sept. 12 Nov. 28 Jan.
 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008 2009
Total credit 850.6 891.7 869.2 888.3 2 198.2 1 989.9
Holdings of non-borrowed federal securities 787.3 724.1 697.5 361.7 271.2 376.2
Credit and portfolio holdings acquired 
from private sector 22.3 102.0 130.5 428.1 1 313.4 1 105.4
 Traditional credita 22.3 62.0 70.5 132.9 193.8 89.5
 Term auction credit  40.0 60.0 150.0 415.3 415.9
 Federal securities term facility    115.9 200.0 125.1
 Facilities for investment banks     64.9 32.1
 Asset-backed commercial paper     80.2 14.6
 Credit to aig      38.3
 Other     82.3 0.0
 Net commercial paper portfolio holdings 
 in limited liability companies     249.9 316.2
 Net portfolio of Maiden Laneb    29.3 26.9 27.0
 Net portfolio of Maiden Lane II and IIIc      46.7
Assets denominated in foreign currencies and others 41.8 66.6 42.4 99.6 615.0 510.3
(Central bank liquidity swaps)      465.9
Float -0.9 -1.0 -1.2 -1.0 -1.5 -2.0
Source: Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.4.1, Washington, D.C., 2009.
a Operations with repurchase agreements, primary, secondary and seasonal credit and overnight lending of Treasury securities.
b Limited liability company created to administer the Bear Stearns portfolio.
c Limited liability company created to administer the aig portfolio.
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towards all agents in the market: commercial and 
investment banks were now joined by mortgage 
intermediaries, mutual funds and even hedge funds. 
Federal Reserve lending to the private sector and 
acquisitions of  private-sector assets increased by 
almost US$ 900 billion between the week ending 
10 September and the week ending 12 November, 
when the latter peaked. On top of  this were the 
credit swaps granted to other central banks around 
the world. In this period of two months and a few 
days, the total Federal Reserve portfolio increased by 
US$ 1.3 trillion (just over 9% of gdp). These assets 
were financed out of government deposits held in the 
Federal Reserve and surplus bank reserves deposited 
there (one of  the manifestations of  the hoarding 
of liquidity throughout the world), which had now 
become interest-bearing. Given that bank reserves 
form part of the monetary base, the latter grew by 
70% between August and November. Much the same 
happened, albeit on a smaller scale, at other central 
banks in the industrialized countries.
These central bank measures were supplemented by 
bank rescue programmes led by various governments. 
Initially, there was a lack of  coordination among 
authorities. In the United States, the ruling party 
opposed the US$ 700 billion rescue package presented 
by the Bush administration, which was ultimately passed 
by Congress in early October thanks to opposition 
support. In Europe, governments announced a series 
of competing initiatives, particularly where deposit 
insurance was concerned. Generally speaking, the 
measures introduced by the United Kingdom on 7 
October set the agenda for the rescue plans. The primary 
focus was on using public money to capitalize financial 
institutions, which in some cases has meant compete 
nationalization (including that of the mortgage giants 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and the aig group 
in the United States). The second measure was the 
expansion of deposit insurance and State guarantees 
for certain credit lines, particularly interbank ones, 
while the third consisted in creating funds to purchase 
“toxic assets”. Although this was at the heart of the 
package originally approved in the United States, it 
was subsequently abandoned as an instrument owing 
to the difficulties of implementing the purchase of 
complex and heterogeneous securities. The Citibank 
rescue announced in late November 2008 and the new 
British package of January 2009 represent a middle 
way between the second and third type of measures 
described above, with governments extending a public 
TABLE 2
United States: selected interest rates
Week ending 10 Aug. 28 March 12 Sept. 31 Oct. 16 Jan. 23 Jan.
 2007 2008 2008 2008 2009 2009
Intervention rates
   Federal Funds 5.25 2.18 1.99 0.82 0.10 0.20
   Discount 6.25 2.50 2.25 1.68 0.50 0.50
Interbank (Libor) 5.43 2.67 2.82 4.70a 1.11 1.14
Treasury securities
   1 month 4.82 1.22 1.53 0.28 0.04 0.03
   10 years 4.79 3.52 3.66 3.92 2.30 2.56
3-m. certificates of  deposit
(secondary market) 5.43 2.74 2.79 3.45 0.85 1.05
Preferential loans 8.25 5.25 5.00 4.43 3.25 3.25
Corporate bonds
   AAA 5.78 5.51 5.46 6.42 4.89 5.10
   BAA 6.66 6.93 7.05 9.49 7.97 8.15
State and local government bonds 4.59 4.96 4.54 5.35 4.80 5.13
Conventional mortgages 6.59 5.85 5.93 6.46  4.96 5.12
Source: Federal Reserve System, Federal Reserve Statistical Release, H.15, Washington, D.C., 1997.
a Week ending 15 September 2008.
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guarantee to excess losses deriving from toxic assets 
still held by financial institutions (or a portion of 
them in the case of Citibank). Oddly enough, until 
January 2009 the rescue packages did not include relief  
for borrowers (particularly poor mortgage holders) 
and nor, despite pressure from some members of 
the United States Democratic Party, had there been 
any changes to the bankruptcy law to allow at least 
smaller mortgages to be renegotiated.
The measures applied have served to correct 
some of  the most glaring distortions generated 
by the financial collapse of  mid-September. After 
rising by almost two percentage points in the month 
following the crisis, the interbank interest rate tended 
to normalize from mid-October onward (see table 2). 
Issues of commercial paper recovered from the low 
point of 22 October (see figure 1), while pressure on 
Federal Reserve lending facilities eased from mid-
November (see table 1). The rate of monetary base 
creation declined but remained high, so that between 
August 2008 and January 2009 a total of US$ 855 
billion was issued, equivalent to just under 6% of 
United States gdp.1
Meanwhile, contrary to the policy objective, there 
was a flight to quality originally manifested in lower 
interest rates on very short-term Treasury bills, which 
became a proxy for money, but this process coincided 
with a rise in market rates (or, what comes to the 
same thing, a significant increase in all risk spreads). 
From November, however, all interest rates began to 
fall, although those on long-term Treasury securities 
fell by far the most. Taken all together, while Federal 
Reserve rates have fallen by 5 to 6 percentage points 
since mid-August 2007, some are still higher than they 
were then (lower-rated corporate bonds and state and 
local government bonds) and others have fallen only 
modestly (highly rated corporate bonds).
This means that, although United States policy 
did enough to overcome the complete lack of liquidity 
that characterized the third phase of the crisis, as of 
January 2009 it had not succeeded in reactivating 
lending, which instead began to contract across the 
board in the closing months of  2008, when bank 
lending also began to be affected. Injecting public 
capital into banks has been a vital means of restoring 
some stability to the system, but as of early 2009 it 
was obvious that this process was not over and could 
1 According to the Federal Reserve H.3 series, the monetary base 
was US$ 1,698 billion in the last two weeks of January 2009, or a 
little over double the August 2008 figure of US$ 843 billion.
end in the complete nationalization of a very large 
number of institutions, especially in Great Britain 
but also in the United States and some countries of 
continental Europe. At the same time, it is not clear 
that this capitalization is sufficient to ensure more 
dynamic lending in the absence of  a recovery in 
economic output.
Economic activity, meanwhile, has plummeted, 
with the industrialized countries seeing a 5% to 6% 
annualized rate of decline in the last quarter of 2008 
and the first quarter of 2009.2 There is a consensus 
among analysts that the effectiveness of monetary 
policy in the United States is very limited and that the 
country is actually in a “liquidity trap”, manifested 
most particularly in the hoarding of the most liquid 
securities (including the depositing of  commercial 
banks’ excess reserves with the Federal Reserve) 
and in the strong demand for short-term Treasury 
securities. For this reason, attention has turned to 
the unconventional monetary measures mentioned 
earlier, whose focus is squarely on reactivating and 
reducing the cost of lending, and on fiscal packages. 
The United States has announced the largest of these, 
worth US$ 800 billion (just under 6% of gdp). In 
other countries, central banks have continued with 
the task —still incomplete in Europe— of lowering 
interest rates.
One way of summing up recent events is to say 
that the third phase of the crisis, characterized by a 
total liquidity freeze in the financial system, has been 
followed since November by a fourth in which this 
problem has disappeared but financial institutions 
remain severely undercapitalized and credit is still 
very restricted, and whose dominant feature is the 
collapse of production activity in the industrialized 
countries, which have dragged the rest of the world 
down with them.
The situation in 2009 will depend on how these 
issues evolve. Most projections in late 2008 saw the 
economies of  the industrialized countries, led by 
the United States, taking a turn for the better in the 
second half of this year. This is an optimistic scenario. 
The experience of the past in the developing world, 
like the Great Depression in the United States and 
Japan’s “lost decade” of the late twentieth century, 
indicate that in crises like the present one that involve 
deleveraging and radical balance sheet adjustments, 
2 Figures announced on 30 January showed United States gdp 
falling at a rate of 3.8% in the last quarter, but analysts expect this 
to be revised down yet further.
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the recessionary effect tends to be powerful and 
long-lasting. The only forecast for 2008 that proved 
accurate was the pessimistic scenario published by 
the United Nations, according to which the recession 
would last throughout 2009, with a fall of 1.5% of 
gdp in the industrialized countries and 0.4% in the 
world as a whole (United Nations, 2009, table I.1). 
Given recent economic activity data (including those 
showing a marked slowdown in the Chinese economy 
in the fourth quarter of 2008), even this scenario now 
looks optimistic. Even the imf  (2009), usually among 
the most optimistic of institutional forecasters, stated 
in late January that global gdp would fall by 0.6% 
at market prices, a cut of  almost two percentage 
points from the estimates it had given out just two 
months earlier. Private-sector forecasters are even 
more pessimistic.
It should be stressed that one of the main problems 
throughout the crisis has been the lack of coordination 
between the international authorities, with the striking 
exception of the measures applied by central banks to 
improve liquidity provision. One of the most recent 
illustrations of this failure of coordination has been 
the lack of consensus in Europe concerning the need 
to implement a more expansionary fiscal policy. In 
any event, it must be remembered that Europe has 
better automatic stabilizers than the United States 
(more generous unemployment insurance in particular) 
and that the onus is therefore on the latter to adopt 
ambitious discretionary fiscal measures. There has 
also been a great deal of discussion as to whether or 
not fiscal packages should focus on higher spending, 
with its guaranteed effects on aggregate demand, 
or include tax measures whose effects on aggregate 
demand are more uncertain.
Again, it has never been clearer that institutional 
improvements are needed to coordinate global 
macroeconomic policies and manage financial 
globalization. In fact, the crisis has also revealed a 
need to create new regulatory institutions in Europe 
and even the United States, given the institutional 
complexity of the latter’s prudential regulatory and 
oversight system, involving as it does a whole host of 
federal and state agencies.
III
The external channels of crisis transmission
As was noted in the introduction to this essay, the 
strong growth experienced by Latin America in 2003-
2007 resulted from the unusual combination of  a 
financial boom, rising commodity prices and a high 
level of  remittances from migrant workers. It was 
thus the reversal of these positive trends that turned 
these factors into external channels transmitting the 
crisis to the region.
1. remittances
Of the three channels referred to, information on 
migrant workers’ remittances is the most fragmented. 
Nonetheless, a review of Latin American balance-of-
payments statistics makes it clear that the period of 
rapid remittance growth ended in 2006. Remittances 
have increased more slowly (by an average of 3%) 
over the past two years, with a moderate contraction 
in Mexico in 2008. In this case, the fall-off  in United 
States construction activity was the most important 
crisis transmission channel for migrant workers, since a 
substantial proportion of workers in the home-building 
sector are Mexican migrants (13.8%, or almost three 
times the 5.1% share of Mexican workers in the United 
States labour force) (J.P. Morgan, 2008). The decline 
of construction in Spain, a very important destination 
for Colombian and Ecuadorian migrants, may have 
had a similar effect.
However, it seems unlikely that there will be a large 
decline in remittances overall. World Bank forecasts for 
2009 see them stagnating instead (Ratha, Mohopatra 
and Xu, 2008). Furthermore, the purchasing power 
of remittances will tend to increase if  the currencies 
of the recipient countries depreciate. Thus, curiously 
enough, continuity of  remittances could have a 
stabilizing effect on household consumption.
2. international trade
The volume of world trade increased by 9.3% a year 
during the recent 2003-2006 boom, more than twice 
as fast as world gdp at market prices (3.8%) (United 
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Nations, 2009, table I.1). However, the growth rate of 
trade volumes has been very sensitive to the business 
cycle, and thus more volatile than that of world gdp. 
Accordingly, international trade has acted as an 
amplifier of both upturns and downturns in production 
activity. Trade growth fell substantially in 2007 and 
2008, so that by September 2008 it stood at just 2% 
(United Nations, 2009, figure I.9). In fact, the partial 
data available indicate that world trade contracted in 
the fourth quarter of 2008. Forecasts from the World 
Bank (2009, table I.1) are for a 2.1% drop in 2009, 
while the pessimistic scenario from the United Nations 
(2009, table I.1) shows a 3.1% decline.
The contraction in trade volumes will be the main 
crisis transmission mechanism for the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole, but it 
will particularly affect those whose export structure 
is dominated by manufactures and services, i.e., 
Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean. In turn, 
commodity price trends will be the determining factor 
for South American exports.
In recent years, the world economy has experienced 
the most spectacular commodity price boom in 
over a century, whether measured by duration (five 
years) or intensity and breadth (World Bank, 2009, 
chapter 2). As table 3 shows, however, the boom was 
much stronger for mining products, including energy 
commodities, than for agricultural products. This is 
manifested in the fact that at their peak, generally in 
the second quarter of 2008, real mineral prices were 
far higher than in the 1970s (this was even truer of 
energy commodities than of  metals). Agricultural 
commodities, on the other hand, barely reached the 
levels of that period.
One consequence of this was that, in the developing 
world as a whole, mining commodity exporters saw 
by far the largest terms-of-trade improvements, 
while the terms of  trade of  agricultural exporters 
held more or less steady and those of manufactured 
goods exporters worsened (United Nations, 2009, 
figure II.6). In Latin America, the most marked 
improvements in the terms of trade were recorded in 
the Andean countries, from the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela to Chile, all major exporters of mining 
products,3 while Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, which 
are exporters of agricultural commodities, saw only 
small improvements, even in 2008. Meanwhile, all 
the Central American countries plus Uruguay, which 
are heavily reliant on oil imports, saw their terms 
of trade worsen, while in Mexico, which combines 
mainly manufacturing exports with external sales of 
oil, they improved slightly (see figure 2).
3 Some commentators do not include Colombia in this pattern, 
but two fifths of that country’s export basket are in fact energy 
commodities (oil and coal) and metals (nickel and gold).
TABLE 3
real commodity prices
(Deflated by manufacturing price index, 1945-1980 = 100)
 Total Agriculture Tropical Other Metals Oil
 non-oil total agriculture agriculture
1945-1970 98.4 98.9 100.1 97.5 96.4 64.6
1971-1980 104.1 103.0 99.6 106.4 109.4 192.1
1981-1990 81.1 75.5 63.1 88.2 106.6 246.3
1991-1997 75.3 73.7 57.9 89.9 82.4 139.5
1998-2003 69.4 67.0 50.7 83.6 80.4 193.7
2004 75.1 69.1 52.8 85.7 102.8 290.7
2005 80.3 72.1 59.5 84.9 118.3 410.7
2006 96.0 76.1 63.8 88.5 187.8 487.0
2007 102.4 80.7 69.7 91.9 202.3 518.7
2008-I 121.0 100.8 94.2 107.5 214.0 687.3
2008-II 123.3 102.1 99.1 105.0 221.5 860.7
2008-III 112.7 94.2 88.5 100.0 198.1 810.0
2008-Oct.  87.9 77.3 66.6 88.2 137.0 503.4
2008-Nov. 80.3 72.6 58.3 87.0 116.3 374.2
Source: José Antonio Ocampo and María Ángela Parra, “The terms of trade for commodities in the twentieth century”, cepal Review, 
No. 79 (LC/G.2200-P), Santiago, Chile, April 2003, updated by the author from the same sources.
18
ThE ImPACT of ThE gLobAL fInAnCIAL CRIsIs on LATIn AmERICA  •  José AnTonIo oCAmPo
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 7  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 9
This difference between mining and agricultural 
commodities indicates that the factors determining 
prices in the two groups of products are very different. 
In the case of energy and mining products, the key 
factor has been the low rate of investment resulting 
from weak market prices for commodities of this type 
between the mid-1980s and the early 2000s. Prices then 
rose sharply because of the high demand generated 
by rapid growth in developing countries over the 
past five years, including strong Chinese demand for 
metals. Investment responded positively, but in all 
mining projects there is a significant time lag between 
investment decisions and higher output. In the case 
of agriculture, and despite the alarm bells rung by 
the food crisis in the first half  of 2008, the imbalance 
between supply and demand was much more moderate. 
One important transmission channel in this case was 
the fact that high energy prices translated into strong 
prices for agricultural commodities that are used, or 
that replace those used, to produce biofuels (Von 
Braun, 2007).
Commodity prices boomed in the second half of 
2007 and the first half of 2008, and dollar depreciation 
and financial speculation drove them still higher. Prices 
peaked and began to retreat around mid-2008, i.e., 
before the financial collapse of September that year. As 
the credit system crumbled, the prices of commodities, 
and particularly energy and mining commodities, went 
into freefall. Even so, by November they were still 
higher in real terms than they had been in the 1970s. 
Tropical agriculture commodities, conversely, had fallen 
back to their low levels of the 1990s. Price declines for 
temperate-zone commodities were more moderate.
The outlook for commodity prices is negative. 
By November they had fallen below the most recent 
projections of the World Bank (2009, table I.4), which 
were for a price drop of 25% for energy commodities 
and 23% for non-energy commodities in 2009. To the 
cumulative decline up to November, furthermore, 
must be added the fresh drop in commodity prices 
in December.
The decline in international trade will be perhaps 
the most important of the channels whereby the global 
crisis is transmitted to Latin America. It could not 
be otherwise, given how much more open the Latin 
American economies are to trade now than in the 
past. The process will bring benefits, the greatest of 
which will come from the reversal of the terms-of-trade 
deterioration for oil-importing countries. The lesson 
of history is that opportunities also arise during crises 
FIGURE 2
Latin America and the Caribbean (selected countries):
terms-of-trade gains and losses
(Percentages of gdp)
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because of the positive effects of a more competitive 
exchange rate in diversifying the production structure, 
but more active production development policies of 
the type espoused by the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac) (most 
recently in eclac, 2008a) will be needed if  advantage 
is to be taken of these opportunities.
3. Capital flows
One of the most striking characteristics of the financial 
flows to the developing world over the past four 
decades has been the change in the factors driving 
booms: whereas in the 1970s it was syndicated bank 
lending to the public sector, this role was played in 
the 1990s by international bond issues and during the 
recent boom by portfolio capital.
The nature of financial flows during the recent 
upsurge can best be appreciated by reviewing the 
external balance sheets of the leading Latin American 
economies (see table 4).4 They show two striking 
changes. The first is an increase in assets, particularly 
international reserves but also direct and portfolio 
investments abroad, in all cases exceeding the rapid 
gdp growth in current dollar terms of  the seven 
countries analysed (this almost doubled between 2003 
and 2007). The second is the pronounced shift in the 
composition of liabilities, characterized essentially by 
lower borrowing and increased portfolio liabilities. The 
latter include investments in the region’s countries by 
international investment funds, which also participate 
in local bond markets. The corollary of this process 
was the boom in both stock and bond markets in the 
countries, which in the latter case expanded by 15 
percentage points of gdp from 2001 to 2007.5 Stock 
market valuations will be examined later on.
Two further aspects of  these external balance 
sheets are worth highlighting. First, the combined 
effect of rising assets and falling liabilities meant that 
net external financial liabilities declined sharply, by 
10 points of gdp between 2003 and 2007. This was 
furthermore a feature shared by all the region’s seven 
largest economies. By late 2007, the net financial 
position was positive in three of them (Argentina, 
4 See Jara and Tovar (2008) and Ocampo (2007) for a more detailed 
analysis of  external financing flows entering Latin America in 
recent years.
5 Ocampo and Tovar (2008) provide a more detailed analysis of 
developments in the bond markets of the Latin American countries 
over the current decade.
Chile and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) and 
close to balance in another two (Colombia and Peru). 
Second, the build-up of reserves looks extremely solid 
when compared with debt liabilities, but much less so 
if  reference is made to all portfolio liabilities. This 
indicates that the reserves build-up may be seen as 
offsetting the accumulation of this class of liabilities. 
In the region’s two largest countries, indeed, reserves 
only covered a relatively small proportion of portfolio 
liabilities in late 2007, while in four (Mexico and, 
albeit from a stronger position, Chile, Peru and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) they have increased 
more slowly than these liabilities over recent years.
This external balance sheet improvement is 
unquestionably the region’s greatest strength as it 
faces less favourable international conditions. In 
particular, it means that the spectre of high external 
public borrowing will be less of  a factor in future 
or, to be more precise, that it will be a factor in a 
smaller number of countries. However, it should be 
emphasized that in recent years portfolio flows, the 
most dynamic component of external financing, have 
proved very volatile once again. Furthermore, as will 
be seen, borrowing by some private-sector firms has 
become a new source of vulnerability.
Throughout the boom period, the relative 
importance of  external financing as a source of 
the region’s balance-of-payments surpluses tended 
to increase. Capital-account balances, which were 
virtually nil between mid-2002 and mid-2004, recovered 
thereafter and began to outstrip current-account 
balances as a source of balance-of-payments surpluses. 
From mid-2006 to mid-2007, capital inflows become 
a veritable flood. In six of the region’s seven largest 
countries (the exception being the Bolivarian Republic 
of  Venezuela), the balance-of-payments surplus in 
the fourth quarter of 2006 and the first half  of 2007 
was close to US$ 113 billion, some US$ 100 billion 
of which was on the capital account (about two thirds 
was accounted for by Brazil and the rest by the other 
five economies) (Ocampo, 2007).
Figure 3, which tracks monthly Latin American 
bond issues on international markets, confirms that 
financing peaked between mid-2006 and mid-2007, 
a period when issuances were rising but unstable and 
the predominance of private firms increased (about 
70% of all issues). In general, corporate issues are 
higher-cost and have shorter average maturities than 
government bonds and thus require more frequent debt 
rollovers. For these reasons, they are more vulnerable 
to fluctuations in capital availability.
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TABLE 4
Latin America (seven countries): external balance sheet
(Percentages of gdp at current prices)
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Assets
  Totala 26.5 29.7 31.9 31.5 31.4 32.4 37.5
  Foreign direct investment 5.8 6.9 7.0 7.2 7.0 7.5 7.9
  Portfolio assets 2.1 2.4 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.9 4.8
  Derivatives 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
  Other investments 12.1 13.3 13.4 12.6 11.4 10.8 12.5
  International reservesa 6.6 7.1 8.3 8.5 9.5 10.0 12.3
Liabilities
  Totala 62.4 65.4 70.4 66.4 61.5 60.3 65.6
  Foreign direct investment 24.5 25.5 28.6 28.1 26.7 25.6 27.2
  Portfolio liabilities 19.8 20.1 23.1 22.9 22.8 23.8 28.0
     Shares 5.5 4.9 7.2 8.4 10.4 13.0 16.9
     Debt 14.3 15.2 15.9 14.5 12.3 10.9 11.1
Derivatives 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Other investmentsa 18.0 19.8 18.6 15.4 11.9 10.7 10.2
Assets - liabilities -35.8 -35.7 -38.4 -34.9 -30.1 -27.9 -28.1
   Direct investment -18.8 -18.6 -21.6 -20.9 -19.7 -18.0 -19.2
   Financial -17.1 -17.1 -16.8 -14.0 -10.4 -9.9 -8.9
Reserves as percentage of  debt 20.3 20.4 24.0 28.3 39.1 46.5 57.9
Reserves as percentage of  portfolio liabilities 33.1 35.5 35.9 37.0 41.6 42.1 44.0
Domestic capital market as percentage of  gdp 34.2 32.1 38.7 39.8 43.8 44.5 49.1
Financial assets - liabilities
   Argentina -0.3 19.8 20.1 22.0 29.5 26.2 29.0
   Brazil -34.9 -36.4 -35.2 -31.0 -24.1 -23.8 -28.9
   Chile -3.2 -1.5 3.9 13.5 17.3 27.6 42.7
   Colombia -13.8 -13.6 -14.5 -10.2 -5.2 -3.1 -0.9
   Mexico -17.6 -16.7 -18.6 -18.4 -19.3 -21.1 -16.7
   Peru -29.4 -27.9 -26.4 -21.3 -14.4 -7.6 -6.8
   Venezuela, Bol. Rep. of  23.9 35.9 48.7 44.6 49.3 50.8 51.3
Reserves as percentage of  portfolio liabilities
   Argentina 2.2 -14.2 1.7 19.6 67.6 72.8 93.4
   Brazil 18.1 13.1 13.6 15.7 23.1 28.6 35.4
   Chile 142.4 145.8 108.3 98.9 93.3 98.3 83.6
   Colombia 78.8 88.1 84.2 91.8 102.7 96.8 1 14.6
   Mexico 30.8 41.6 42.7 39.0 35.8 30.0 29.0
   Peru 131.1 125.4 105.2 114.4 91.7 98.2 97.5
   Venezuela, Bol. Rep. of  131.1 125.4 105.2 114.4 91.7 98.2 97.5
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  data from the International Monetary Fund (imf), International Financial Statistics 
[online].
N.B.: current-dollar gdp data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac); domestic capital market 
data from the Bank for International Settlements. The data are for the seven largest economies (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru and the Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela).
a The value of liabilities with the International Monetary Fund has been deducted from these accounts.
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Figure 4 shows another striking feature of the 
boom period: the large reduction in external financing 
costs. From mid-2004 onward, country risk spreads on 
Latin American bonds, like those of emerging markets 
generally, were systematically lower than they had been 
before the Asian crisis. Furthermore, having initially 
been wider than the emerging market average, these 
spreads tended to approach that average. Meanwhile, 
although Federal Reserve interest rates also rose over 
the period (from September 2004 onward), the rates 
on long-term Treasury securities, which provide a 
benchmark for price-setting in international bond 
markets, were not greatly affected. The result was 
that falling spreads translated into a sharp decline in 
external financing costs, from 10% in the first half  of 
2004 to just under 7% at their lowest point in April 
and May 2007. This trend altered on two occasions: 
in March 2005, because of rising interest rates in all 
markets, and in the second quarter of 2006, reflecting a 
more specific emerging-market shock whose epicentre 
was Shanghai. It should be added that the reduction 
in financing costs was experienced right across the 
region, although it was moderate in the two countries 
already considered low-risk before the boom (Chile 
and Mexico).
This financial market “exuberance” was transmitted 
to the Latin American economies via three different 
channels. In the first place, there was the downward 
pressure on domestic interest rates generated by the 
reduction in external financing costs. A second and 
sometimes complementary factor was that this pressure 
was reflected in exchange rates. Lastly, strong risk 
appetite was manifested in stock market inflation. The 
great boom in Latin American stock markets began 
in mid-2004, i.e., when the country risk spreads of the 
region’s countries began to fall rapidly. On average, 
stock prices in the region’s seven largest economies 
quadrupled in dollar terms between mid-2004 and 
mid-2007 (see figure 5).
The international financial crisis has spread in 
complex ways over time and had different effects on 
the different countries of the region. The initial impact, 
during the third quarter of 2007, consisted of a large 
decline in capital flows and bond issues (see figure 3), a 
moderate increase in financing costs (see figure 4) and 
a likewise moderate decline in stock markets, which 
was quickly reversed (see figure 5). Compared to the 
previous market shock of May to July 2006, spreads 
were more volatile between July and September 2007, 
but the effects were diverse. Displaying a pattern that 
FIGURE 3
Bond issues on international markets
(Millions of dollars)
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FIGURE 4
Latin America and emerging countries: sovereign bond yields
FIGURE 5
Stock markets
(July 2003-June 2004 = 100)
Source: Prepared by the author on the basis of  data from Morgan Stanley.
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would subsequently be heightened and that reflects 
an element of so-called “political risk”, the increase 
in and volatility of spreads were greatest in Argentina 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. In Brazil 
and Colombia, meanwhile, just as in May to July 2006, 
exchange rates were particularly sensitive to short-
term movements in spreads; there was also a strong 
correlation between the two variables in Mexico, but 
with much lower levels of volatility. Chile and Peru 
were the economies least affected (see table 5).
This turbulent situation was followed, however, by 
an “Indian summer” in which financing costs fell back 
again and financing flows were renewed. The latter, 
however, did not rise back to their earlier levels and 
became more irregular, as can be seen from monthly 
bond issues. By contrast with the global pattern (a 
brief recovery in October 2007 followed by a downward 
trend), Latin American stock prices, measured in 
dollars, resumed their upward trend and actually 
peaked in May 2008, although this largely reflected 
the strong appreciation of the Brazilian real.
The new upset in the market occurred in June 
2008, and thus clearly predated the financial collapse 
of September. In fact, it coincided with the reversal 
of  the upward trend in commodity prices. This 
relationship is explained by the fact that many emerging 
multinationals in Latin America are producers of 
industrial commodities such as steel and cement. Bond 
emissions plummeted in June and July and disappeared 
from the market from August onward. Financing costs 
had already risen by half  a percentage point by the 
time of the September 2008 collapse. The volatility 
of spreads was much the same as it had been during 
the shock in the third quarter of 2007. Argentina and 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela moved further 
away from the other large countries, while in Brazil 
and Colombia exchange rates once again proved 
particularly unstable. Stock markets fell sharply, but 
prior to the September upheaval still averaged levels 
three and a half  times as high as in mid-2004.
The collapse of mid-September 2008 dramatically 
heightened these tendencies.6 Lending of every kind 
dried up and capital departed the region via some rather 
unexpected channels: worldwide securities sell-offs as 
mutual and hedge fund deposits were redeemed in 
the United States, and the dismantling of carry trade 
operations conducted out of  Japan, one of whose 
6 A recent essay by Bustillo and Velloso (2009) provides a detailed 
analysis of the effects of the international financial crisis on the 
Latin American economies.
beneficiaries had been Brazil. This caused all the Latin 
American currencies to depreciate sharply, while the 
dollar and yen appreciated on international markets. 
Furthermore, exchange-rate fluctuations resulted in 
large losses on futures markets, especially in Brazil 
and Mexico. The sum total of net capital outflows 
from Latin America during the fourth quarter of 
2008 is unknown, but the loss of reserves in most of 
the countries is a manifestation of the phenomenon. 
The other effects are known with accuracy: financing 
costs rose substantially (see figure 4) and stock markets 
fell by much more than those in the industrialized 
countries (see figure 5); spreads became very volatile 
and their correlation with exchange-rate movements 
increased in all the countries (see table 5); Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico were now the countries with the 
most unstable exchange rates, while Colombia proved 
more stable than in earlier episodes, perhaps because 
its legal reserve requirement for incoming capital had 
reduced the volume of more volatile capital; and the 
gap between spreads in Argentina and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela and those in the other large 
economies of Latin America widened significantly, 
to 10 or more percentage points.
In line with interest rate movements in the United 
States (see table 2), financing costs peaked in late 
October (12.35% on 23 October) before declining 
and tending to stabilize at between 9% and 10% from 
mid-December, a level not far removed from those 
prevailing before the boom which began in 2004 and 
two to three percentage points higher than those 
considered normal before the United States financial 
crisis. The greatest pressure on currency markets 
also arose between mid-September and late October; 
although currencies have depreciated less since then, 
markets have remained very volatile. Stock markets 
have also tended to stabilize, and indeed in Latin 
America they have done so at levels higher than those 
of mid-2004, by contrast with what has happened in 
other markets (see figure 5).
Although there appears to have been a recovery 
from the worst symptoms of the financial collapse 
associated with the complete illiquidity characterizing 
the third phase of the United States financial crisis, its 
more permanent effects persist. All current projections 
indicate that private capital flows will remain at low 
levels for the immediate future. Projections by the 
Institute of International Finance (2009), for example, 
indicate that in 2009 private lending flows into all 
emerging economies will be negative, by comparison 
with net inflows of over US$ 600 billion in 2007, but 
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TABLE 5
Latin America (selected countries): exchange-rate and 
risk spread volatility in periods of turbulence
 Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Ven., B.R. of  embi +
Risk spread volatilitya
   May 2006-Jul. 2006 26.2 19.6 3.6 27.7 14.7 10.1 20.9 16.4
   Jul. 2007-Sep. 2007 60.6 21.9 14.5 31.6 15.0 23.5 64.6 25.0
   Jun. 2008-12 Sep. 2008 58.5 24.2 7.0 24.3 22.1 24.0 48.0 24.5
   15 Sep. 2008-Jan. 2009 352.4 79.4 61.4 104.7 82.4 92.6 306.6 126.5
Average spreads
   May 2006-Jul. 2006 362.8 249.3 81.0 215.4 134.3 167.5 207.6
   Jul. 2007-Sep. 2007 414.2 187.3 105.6 167.3 111.9 151.3 389.2
   Jun. 2008-12 Sep. 2008 632.5 226.5 173.0 211.5 168.5 190.1 623.4
   15 Sep. 2008-Jan. 2009 1 572.6 450.7 323.5 502.6 384.0 470.1 1 492.2
Exchange-rate volatilityb
   May 2006-Jul. 2006 0.56 3.24 2.11 3.12 1.81 0.57 2.24
   Jul. 2007-Sep. 2007 0.78 2.95 0.91 4.51 1.21 0.57 0.00
   Jun. 2008-12 Sep. 2008 0.59 3.16 2.74 5.99 1.55 2.17 0.00
   15 Sep. 2008-Jan. 2009 3.63 8.20 6.28 3.64 7.70 1.86 0.00
Average exchange rate
   May 2006-Jul. 2006 3.07 2.20 535 2494 11.16 3.26 2.59
   Jul. 2007-Sep. 2007 3.14 1.92 520 2041 10.96 3.15 2.15
   Jun. 2008-12 Sep. 2008 3.03 1.62 507 1818 10.26 2.89 2.15
   15 Sep. 2008-Jan. 2009 3.32 2.23 628 2260 12.87 3.09 2.15
Ratio between exchange rate and embi +
   May 2006-Jul. 2006 0.789 0.832 0.796 0.885 0.755 -0.388 0.477
   Jul. 2007-Sep. 2007 0.818 0.658 0.364 0.789 0.930 0.059 0.000
   Jun. 2008-12 Sep. 2008 -0.145 0.440 0.752 0.788 0.177 0.375 0.000
   15 Sep. 2008-Jan. 2009 0.751 0.876 0.901 0.678 0.901 0.808 0.000
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  data from J.P. Morgan Chase.
N.B.: embi = Emerging Markets Bond Index.
a Standard deviation.
b Coefficient of variation.
that the large outflows of portfolio capital seen in 
2008 will be stemmed. All studies suggest that the 
most critical problems will arise when the region’s 
major private firms seek to roll over their debt (see, for 
example, J.P. Morgan, 2009). Consequently, the heavy 
reliance of these firms on industrial commodities and 
the drastic shortening of financing maturities will be 
the main weaknesses of the capital account.
These problems, plus the major uncertainties 
deriving from the still partially unresolved financial 
crisis in the industrialized world, suggest that the 
weakness of  private-sector external financing will 
persist for some time. However, it is possible that 
the capital-account crisis in Latin America will be 
less acute than on earlier occasions because of the 
better starting conditions this time around in terms 
of reserve levels and external debt. Furthermore, one 
favourable side-effect of the new context has been the 
easing of the powerful pressures causing currencies 
to appreciate in a number of the region’s countries 
during the boom. These subjects will be the main 
focus of the following section.
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The history of Latin America since the 1970s has been 
marked not only by major external shocks, both positive 
and negative, but also by macroeconomic policies 
that have tended to heighten rather than mitigate 
the effects of these upheavals on domestic economic 
activity, i.e., procyclical macroeconomic policies. The 
fundamental problem with this behaviour is that a 
number of vulnerabilities arise during the favourable 
phases of the business cycle, essentially in the form of 
public- or private-sector deficits which lead to high 
levels of borrowing and corresponding balance-of-
payments current-account deficits, further exacerbated 
by overvalued national currencies. These vulnerabilities 
are exposed when the exceptional external conditions 
come to an end and severe macroeconomic adjustments 
have to be made in the form of  fiscal tightening 
(involving differing combinations of spending cuts 
and tax increases), restrictive monetary and credit 
policies and large exchange-rate adjustments.
Compared with this historical pattern, it has 
been argued that the recent economic boom led to an 
important change in macroeconomic policy, reflected in 
the higher priority given to macroeconomic equilibria 
(see eclac, 2008c, among others). As evidence for 
this, the proponents of this view point to the healthier 
public accounts and current-account surpluses that 
characterized the region during the boom period.
This interpretation of recent economic history 
in Latin America needs to be qualified, however, in 
a number of ways. A far more realistic reading is the 
one presented by the Inter-American Development 
Bank (idb, 2008), largely based on the work of 
Izquierdo, Romero and Talvi (2008) and agreeing 
with my own position in an earlier paper (Ocampo, 
2007). According to this alternative view, the cause 
of  the recent good performance was the strength 
of the external factors that drove the boom, since 
economic policy generally remained procyclical. The 
most important and common differences from the past 
were lower external borrowing by the public sector 
and the build-up of international reserves.
Table 6 presents a summary of developments in 
fiscal indicators. As can be seen, in 2008 just three 
countries ran a central government deficit of more 
than 2%: Brazil, Colombia and the Dominican 
Republic. In almost all the countries, furthermore, 
central government debt as a proportion of gdp was 
substantially lower than at the beginning of the previous 
crisis, with the exceptions of Brazil and Colombia once 
again, plus Argentina and Uruguay. However, these 
positive fiscal results were primarily due to exceptional 
public-sector revenues and not spending policies, which 
generally remained procyclical, with some exceptions.7 
The most notable of these is Chile, a country that has 
followed structural balance rules for its fiscal accounts 
for almost a decade, reinforced during the economic 
boom by means of two stabilization funds designed 
to save the fiscal surpluses generated by high copper 
prices: the Economic and Social Stabilization Fund 
and the Pensions Reserve Fund.
As table 6 shows, the gdp-elasticity of primary 
spending was over 1 in almost all the region’s economies. 
According to countercyclical rules, however, spending 
ought to increase by significantly less than gdp during 
economic upturns, i.e., the gdp-elasticity should be 
less than 1. The exceptions, besides Chile, were El 
Salvador and Guatemala. Although there are other 
countries where elasticity was less than 1, real primary 
spending growth during the boom exceeded the long-
term growth rate of the economies concerned.
This procyclical behaviour of fiscal policy stands 
in contrast to the complex institutional apparatus 
introduced since the late 1990s in the form of numerous 
fiscal responsibility laws and newly created stabilization 
funds. Rule changes and the practice of earmarking 
resources in advance indicate that hitherto the effects 
of these fiscal institutions have been limited (Jiménez 
and Tromben, 2006).
Developments in the external accounts also 
reveal a pattern that is far from suggesting a policy 
approach designed to generate balance-of-payments 
current-account surpluses. Once again, the determining 
external factor was the sharp improvement in the 
7 See, in particular, idb (2008, chapter 3). A study by eclac 
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TABLE 6
Latin America: fiscal indicators
(Percentages)
 Central government 
Central government debt
 
Real primary surplus or deficit (percentages of  gdp) 
spending growth (percentages of  gdp)  
2003-2007
 2007 2008 2007 2008 Change
     1998-2008 
Argentina 0.6 1.0 55.7 48.0 10.4 11.9
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2.3 3.0 37.1 30.7 -24.4 5.0
Brazil -2.0 -2.6 32.7 30.1 5.9 9.0
Chile  8.8 6.9 4.1 3.5 -8.6 2.5
Colombia -3.0 -2.7 35.2 33.2 11.1 7.9
Costa Rica 0.6 -0.5 27.7 23.5 -19.4 5.1
Ecuador -0.1 -0.1 27.5 22.6 -34.4 10.3
El Salvador -0.2 -0.6 34.5 31.2 -2.1 0.4
Guatemala -1.5 -1.2 21.7 19.3 2.9 2.9
Honduras -2.9 -1.9 17.4 17.4 -57.6 7.4
Mexico 0.0 0.0 21.1 20.4 -7.4 5.9
Nicaragua 0.6 0.8 42.2 34.6 -89.6 6.4
Panama 1.2 -1.0 53.2 46.6 -15.4 8.2
Paraguay 1.0 0.5 17.3 12.1 -8.4 4.4
Peru 1.8 2.3 27.2 22.8 -14.4 7.4
Dominican Republic 0.6 -3.2 19.0 16.7 -1.5 10.2
Uruguay -1.7 -1.0 50.7 39.9 15.9 6.4
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) 3.0 -1.8 19.3 14.0 -15.4 13.4
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac).
terms of trade. Figure 6 shows an estimate for the 
current-account balance of  the region as a whole, 
with and without terms-of-trade adjustments. In the 
former case, the base year taken is the one preceding 
the economic boom, i.e., 2003. As can be seen, the 
current-account surplus was entirely due to the terms-
of-trade improvement. Adjusted for this variable, the 
current account registered a growing deficit throughout 
the boom period. This reached the equivalent of 5% 
of gdp in 2008, a much higher figure than that for 
the Latin American economies before the crisis of 
the late twentieth century.
Table 7 gives a more detailed overview. As it 
shows, the only economies to record a current-account 
surplus up to 2008 were three hydrocarbon exporters 
(Plurinational State of  Bolivia, Ecuador and the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) and Argentina. 
Another two whose exports are based on mining 
commodities (Chile and Peru) ran surpluses up to 
2007, but these declined sharply in 2008. As table 7 
reveals, both countries were already running substantial 
current-account deficits in 2007 if  the adjustment 
is made for changes in the terms of  trade. Brazil 
followed a similar path, albeit the country’s initial 
surplus was more modest. The only economies to 
show a small current-account surplus in 2008, when 
adjusted for the terms of trade, were Plurinational 
State of Bolivia and Uruguay. In the latter, the current 
deficit was therefore due to high prices for imported 
hydrocarbons. Otherwise, what this indicates is that 
given the collapse of mining and energy commodity 
prices, countries with an export base of this type will 
need to undergo a major adjustment process over the 
coming years.
One of the basic explanations for the current-
account deterioration over the period of  strong 
economic growth was, as formerly, the tendency 
towards real currency appreciation. As table 7 shows, 
this was particularly strong in Brazil, Colombia and 
the Bolivarian Republic of  Venezuela, but also in 
a number of  smaller economies (Guatemala, the 
Dominican Republic and Uruguay). Chile also 
experienced peso appreciation in real terms, although 
this was more moderate. The most notable exceptions 
here were Plurinational State of Bolivia and Peru; 
Argentina was also an exception until 2006, but the 
real-term devaluation shown in table 7 owes more to 
official underestimates of the inflation rate in recent 
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years. The real-term devaluation undergone by the 
United States currency during the boom favoured 
the three dollarized economies (Ecuador, El Salvador 
and Panama).
Figure 7, meanwhile, reveals that the only aspects 
in which the Latin American economies have shown a 
systematic and consistent improvement in relation to 
the past are external public borrowing and the build-
up of international reserves. To correct the effects of 
real exchange-rate variations on gdp, the estimates 
used 2000 purchasing power parity exchange rates. As 
can be seen, there was a substantial improvement in 
net external debt levels, thanks to lower borrowing up 
until 2006 and the build-up of international reserves 
since then. The reduction in public borrowing was due 
both to explicit fiscal policy decisions (less external 
financing and greater use of growing domestic capital 
markets) and to programmes favouring heavily 
indebted poor countries and the renegotiation of the 
Argentine debt.
The reserves build-up, meanwhile, resulted from 
explicit decisions to accumulate both current-account 
surpluses (usually generated, as we have seen, by 
exceptional commodity prices) and the flood of external 
financing. The latter is reflected in figure 8, which 
calculates the build-up of reserves as a proportion 
of gdp in six of the seven largest Latin American 
economies during the three phases of plentiful external 
financing. As can be seen, Argentina was among the 
first to bring in a policy of building up reserves (the 
reserves deriving in this case from the current-account 
surplus rather than from the capital account). Other 
than Mexico, all the countries in the chart intervened 
actively in the market to accumulate some of the funds 
entering in the flood of external financing between 
mid-2006 and 2007.8 Chile and Peru did the same 
during the first half of 2008, as did other countries to 
a lesser degree. This “fear of floating” when confronted 
with that surge of external capital was thus one of 
the great virtues of Latin American macroeconomic 
management during the recent economic boom (as 
it was, indeed, in the developing world generally), 
although in some cases it did not serve to prevent 
real currency appreciation.
As a result both of lower public-sector external 
borrowing and of the reserves build-up, virtually all 
the countries are well placed in this respect (see table 
7). The main exceptions are certain Central American 
countries (El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama) and, to 
8 In the case of  Chile, the calculations include the transfer of 
resources to stabilization funds. The balances of these funds were 
also added to the international reserves total to calculate the 
country’s external borrowing ratios.
FIGURE 6
Latin America: current account with and without terms-of-trade adjustment 
(Percentages, base year 2003)
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Current-account balance Adjusted for terms of trade
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FIGURE 7
Latin America: external debt, gross and net of international reserves
(2000 exchange rate)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of data from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (eclac).
N.B.: In the case of  Chile, includes resources in sovereign wealth funds.
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FIGURE 8
Latin America (selected countries): reserves accumulated
in periods of plentiful external financing
(Percentages of gdp)
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of  data from the International Monetary Fund (imf), International Financial Statistics 
[online].
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a lesser extent, South American countries that inherited 
a heavy external debt burden from the previous crisis 
(Argentina, Ecuador and Uruguay). Plurinational 
State of Bolivia is running large surpluses and in 2008 
Brazil was in a position of virtual equilibrium.
This favourable situation as regards public and 
external borrowing is the region’s main asset in the 
current crisis. Where public borrowing is concerned, 
with some exceptions (Brazil and Colombia being the 
most obvious ones) there is greater scope than in the 
past to adopt countercyclical fiscal policies. Chile of 
course has particular room for manoeuvre because it 
saved a substantial volume of fiscal revenues during 
the economic boom. In a number of economies, high 
levels of  international reserves have been used to 
mitigate the effects of the crisis on export sectors and 
private-sector firms without access to financing. During 
the most critical months of the crisis, they also meant 
that some liquidity provision policies could be applied. 
Central banks subsequently began to cut interest rates, 
a tendency that has been spreading widely as of early 
2009. Exchange rates came under pressure more rapidly 
than in the past, allowing the overvaluation that was a 
feature of several economies (Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
and Mexico chief among them) to be quickly corrected. 
These measures were supplemented by a wide range 
of fiscal, sectoral and social policies (eclac, 2009). 
Other than the rapid depreciation of a few currencies, 
however, the macroeconomic repercussions of these 
initiatives have so far been moderate.
V
Conclusions
The international crisis has had the anticipated effects 
on Latin America. Having been underpinned by 
an exceptional combination of favourable external 
conditions, the economic boom came to an end and 
all the factors that nurtured it are now working in the 
opposite direction. Of these, the possible decline in 
remittances is the least important and will be offset in 
several countries by real currency depreciation, which 
will positively affect the domestic consumption capacity 
of the households receiving these resources.
The greatest and most widespread repercussions 
of the crisis will be felt in the sphere of trade. All the 
countries, but especially Mexico, Central America and 
the Caribbean, are being affected by the contraction 
in real trade volumes, while the South American 
economies, particularly those exporting mining and 
energy commodities, have experience a sharp decline 
in their terms of trade. The fall in energy prices will 
partially offset the adverse effects of lower international 
trade in a number of small economies.
From an external financing point of view, it is 
possible that the most acute problems associated with 
the illiquidity characterizing the severest stage of the 
crisis (between mid-September and late October 2008) 
may be behind us. However, a phase of very restricted 
private-sector external financing, of unknown duration 
and intensity, still lies ahead. Multilateral financing 
can only partly compensate for the dearth of private 
funding, unless it is accompanied by measures such 
as an exceptional large-scale issue of special drawing 
rights by the imf. The benefits of this financing will 
also depend on the conditions attached to the use of 
Fund resources, an issue on which some progress has 
been made, although more remains to be done. The 
lack of private-sector financing will particularly affect 
certain large private-sector firms with an obvious need 
to roll over debt.
The Latin American economies went into the crisis 
with greater strengths than in the past, but these are 
more modest than has been claimed in some optimistic 
studies on the handling of the recent economic boom. 
With some striking exceptions, Chile chief  among 
them, fiscal policies have remained procyclical. In 
most of the countries, furthermore, there has been a 
tendency for the current account to deteriorate, a process 
exacerbated in many cases by currency appreciation. 
Lower external borrowing by the public sector and 
the decision to absorb the flood of external financing 
by building up reserves are the two key elements of 
this new-found strength and are a departure from 
the way economic upturns were handled in the past. 
We do not yet know how much scope they really 
offer for adopting countercyclical macroeconomic 
policies during the crisis that is beginning. Hitherto, 
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the only really definite development has been the 
rapid correction of the acute overvaluation of certain 
currencies in the region.
The crises of the past indicate that real currency 
depreciation is an opportunity to diversify the 
production structure. It may in fact be the most 
important of the opportunities offered by the current 
situation, and it should thus be actively pursued by 
applying production development policies.
Regional markets also offer an opportunity for 
diversification, a kind of “import substitution” in the 
region as a whole rather than in individual countries. 
However, opportunities of this kind will depend on 
other factors. In recent decades, intraregional trade 
has in fact been highly procyclical and integration 
efforts are going through a period of weakness or even 
crisis. Furthermore, major differences in respect of 
exchange-rate adjustments within current integration 
agreements could, in combination with individual 
protection measures, actually exacerbate the difficulties 
these efforts are currently facing.
There is now greater scope than in the past to apply 
countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies, and sparing 
use has begun to be made of these, but this scope is 
still limited. It will undoubtedly relieve countries of 
the need to adopt overly restrictive policies, with the 
exception of some whose handling of the economic 
boom was markedly procyclical. In summary, Latin 
America is better prepared than on other occasions, 
but this will serve to mitigate only some of the effects 
of the worst crisis the world economy has experienced 
since the Great Depression.
(Original: Spanish)
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